You may have heard the term “living off the land” where attackers that have compromised a device within your network, will try to evade being discovered or blocked by your security solutions. Perhaps you have an EDR/MDR solution, logging capabilities, or even your own Security Operations Center (SOC) keeping an eye out for intruders. But is this enough?
Attackers that are living off the land realize that today’s security solutions are constantly evolving, monitoring processes and programs being executed in real-time, sandboxing the unknown, and looking to see if anything malicious could be happening. So, what happens if a known, vendor-signed process or program is executed? Will your security solution detect if something malicious is secretly happening?
On many engagements which utilize Windows Operating Systems, it has been possible to evade detection of Antivirus, as well as EDR solutions, including Windows Defender and CrowdStrike Falcon by leveraging Microsoft signed and verified tools that reside on the system.
How attackers can avoid detection
For example, if an attacker tries to download or copy a malicious file to a compromised machine using, FTP, a web browser, a PowerShell or CMD command, the chances of this being detected can be extremely high. Especially when the file to be downloaded is a PowerShell script from GitHub which assists with Active Directory enumeration.
To evade detection, one built-in tool that may be leveraged is the ‘bitsadmin’ tool, used for managing background transfers.
You can find this tool in the following file paths:
In this scenario, it was possible to successfully download the PowerShell script from GitHub, executing a command similar to:
bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 file-URL save-location bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1
There are many other tools that can be used here. Another example is `cmdl32.exe` which by default is located here:
An attacker may be able to issue a CMD command as such to download a file from a remote host whilst evading the EDR solution which believes only a legitimate process is running.
A command as simple as:
cmdl32 /vpn /lan %cd%\config
With there being just a few examples, what are the recommendations?
Secondly, review your logging and monitoring procedures. Ensure that also built-in tools that are signed by Microsoft are being added to the watch lists.
Last of all, not just one solution may be enough to stop the most experienced of attackers. Defense in depth is recommended, so having multiple security solutions in place might just help keep you one step in front.